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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND CHINA'S
COMPETITION LAWS
MARK S. BLODGETT**
RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR.".
ROBERT M. HAYDEN****
"Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches
mice, it is a good cat. " Deng Xiaoping
I. INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China, or the PRC, known more widely simply as
China, holds nearly one-sixth of the world's population. It possesses one of the
fastest growing economies in the world. In 2007, China experienced a growth rate
of 114%.1 As a result of its strong economy and growing population, China has
the ability to greatly influence the global economy. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the newly adopted Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, or AML, has been the
subject of much interest, discussion, and debate. The legislation, which became
effective August 1, 2008, has a variety of purposes: to safeguard competition in
China; to protect the Chinese economy against monopolistic conduct; to improve
economic efficiency; and, perhaps most importantly from the Chinese perspective,
to promote the healthy development of its "socialist market economy."
2
* The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of
this article's Chinese language sources, with regard to citations, references, and translation.
.. Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University,
Boston, Mass. Director, Center for Global Business Ethics & Law.
*** Professor of Legal Studies and International Business, Stillman School of Business, Seton
Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey. Fellow, Institute for International Business.
.... Assistant Vice President, The Bank of New York Mellon.
1. Information relating to economic growth, investment, foreign trade, population, and other
economic and political factors are garnered and adapted from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbooklgeos/ch.html#Econ [hereinafter CIA].
2. Not surprisingly, various translations and drafts of the AML exist. See Anti-Monopoly Law of
China (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007), art. 1, translated in
Nathan Bush, O'Melveny & Myers L.L.P., The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and
Challenges Ahead, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, at app. 1-14 (Oct. 2007),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/OctO7-BushI 0-18f.pdf; Anti-Monopoly Law of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008),
2007 Order of the President No. 68, translated in 2007 China Law LEXIS 1950. The content of this
article, however, refers to the AML translation provided in Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law.
See also H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Legal Implications of a Rising China: The Making of an Antitrust Law.
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Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai, has
underscored the contextual importance of China's transformation and transition in
the development of the AML. The Minister noted on July 12, 2005, that China had
essentially completed the transition to a socialist market economy from a highly
centralized planned economy "after 26 years' endeavor on reform." 3 Minister Ma
asserted that China had successfully established the fundamental basis of an
economic system in which public ownership of the economy plays the "leading
role and co-exists and shares opportunities with the economy in various other
ownerships.",4 Indeed, by the end of 2004, more than fifty percent of the nearly
3,000 state-owned or state-controlled large major enterprises had turned into stock-
sharing (so-called joint stock) companies. As an indication of the pervasiveness
of market forces in the "new Chinese market," the private sector now provides
"four-fifths of new job opportunities and generate[s] one-third of Chinese GDP."6
In this context, the drive for both foreign direct investment and foreign trade-key
aspects of the Chinese economy that would rely heavily on the proper functioning
of a truly competitive market--occupy unique positions of importance.
The Chinese AML was drafted within the context of three principal
international concerns relating to the restrictive or monopolistic nature of
competition within the Chinese market: regional monopolies, enjoying local or
regional protection; certain sectoral monopolies by established Chinese firms and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), termed administrative monopolies; and the
perception of significant abuse of their dominant positions by some multinationals
operating within the Chinese market.7
While the legislation represents yet another significant step towards China's
transition to a full market economy and away from one that is centrally planned, 8
The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 183-84
(2006) (providing information on the AML history and draft).





7. See Jun Wei & Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Law, China's Anti-Monopoly Law, NAT'L L. J.,
Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/1495de2a-b3Od-44ad-822c-
6ffea0cd69bf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/145c9a50-bl eb-4083-885f-
863242014c68/15Oct07_NLJChinaAntiMonopolyJWeiJMcDavid.pdf.
8. The Polish process of economic transformation is quite instructive and has provided a more
general model for Eastern and Central European nations, as well as for a systemic comparison for
China. Named for the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, the
program in Poland was based on five philosophical pillars of economic transformation: (1)
transformation of the monocentric system of state central planning into a functioning market economy;
(2) liberalization of economic functions, especially in relation to foreign trade and foreign direct
investment; (3) privatization of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs); (4) construction of an effective social
safety net; and (5) mobilization of international financial assistance to support the process. In the
process of economic transformation, Balcerowicz was aided by a well-prepared transition team
consisting of Polish nationals and so-called "Polonia" (6migre) specialists. The leading foreign expert
was Harvard Economist Jeffrey Sachs. Both Balcerowicz, who later served as President of the National
Bank of Poland, and Sachs remain enigmatic and quite controversial figures even today in Poland. For
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many commentators have expressed concern over the vague and inefficient
mechanics of the proposed legislation.9 One specific concern is that China will
reserve to itself the ability to review any transaction affecting its "national
security," which may provide China with unreasonable control over multi-
nationals operating in the Chinese market.
This article will analyze several of the concerns raised by the new legislation.
In order to accomplish this purpose, the article will first discuss the history and
progression of the legislation, beginning with the circumstances that led to initial
discussions on the issue which began as early as 1994. Information on the
background of the legislation from a comparative systemic viewpoint-that is,
from the standpoint of Poland, itself a "transition economy"-will be offered. The
article will next review several of the most important provisions of the new law
and will discuss similarities and differences between the final draft legislation and
the competition laws of other nations. Finally, the article will conclude with an
analysis of why the legislation may prove unworkable for China in the long run in
the global business environment without significant refinement or amendment by
raising several of the persistent concerns raised by its implementation.
II. CHINA IN TRANSITION - THE CONTEXT
In 1978, Chinese President Deng Xiaoping began a series of initiatives in
order to transform China's economy from a traditional command-and-control
economy into China's version of a "market economy," later termed a "socialist
market economy." In fact, the Chinese Constitution itself was amended in 1988
and 1999 to incorporate the concept of a "socialist market economy," rather than
one based solely on state central planning.10 The initiatives carried out were a part
a discussion of the core transformation program from a "foreign" viewpoint, see JEFREY SACHS,
POLAND'S JUMP TO THE MARKET ECONOMY 45-46 (1994). For a unique "insider" view of the process,
see LESZEK BALCEROWICZ, SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, TRANSFORMATION 273-369 (1996).
Interestingly, the elements of the "Balcerowicz Plan" all have been implemented, in one form or
another, in China in its transition to a socialist market economy.
9. Leszek Balcerowicz, the architect of "shock therapy" in Poland, has identified certain
derivative traits of the command-and-control economy that were pervasive in the entire region of
Central and Eastern Europe, and as well in China, and which were the object of systemic economic
reform. These include:
" Administrative price fixing by central authorities;
" Isolation of domestic producers from foreign markets;
" Excessive regulation of imports through licenses and import quotas;
" The tendency by central planners to engage in "import substitution," often accomplished
through rationing, queues, lines and coupons;
" "Soft budget constraint" in which targets of planning are revised downward or inputs
significantly increased in order to meet plan targets;
" The lack of true commercial andfinancial institutions;
" Monopolization of the state sector due to extreme organizational concentration, the
centralization of organizational rights, and the lack of foreign competition; and perhaps most
importantly,
* The lack of any motivation mechanisms for either line managers or workers.
See generally RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. & LEO V. RYAN, FROM AUTARCHY TO MARKET: POLISH
ECONOMICS & POLITICS 1945-1995,37 (1998).
10. See XIAN FA art. 15 (1988) (P.R.C.) (amended Mar. 29, 1993); XIAN FA pmbl. (1988) (P.R.C.)
2009
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of a pursuit of Four Modernizations in the areas of industry, agriculture, science
and technology, and the military.' During this transition period, China became
more and more reliant on international trade and foreign investment for its growth.
Professor Mark Williams has noted:
The expansion of China's participation in international trade has been
one of the most outstanding features of the country's economic
development. Chinese exports rose on average 5.7 percent in the 1980s,
12.4 percent in the 1990s, and 20.3 percent between 2000 and 2003. By
2003, China's exports growth rate was seven times higher than the
export growth rate recorded by the world as a whole. Foreign direct
investment has also soared, and currently over a billion dollars in FDI
are invested in China each week.
12
(amended Mar. 14, 2004); XIAN FA art. 11 (amended Mar. 14, 2004) available at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). For a definitive
description of the system of central planning, see JANOS KORNAL, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM (1992). As early as 1960, Polish economist and diplomat Oskar
Lange had written of a "'new economic calculus' where decentralization in planning and management
of the economy was both vital and necessary.' Lange had argued that the Stalinist scheme was not
suited to a "mechanical translation," and that prices, for example, should be fixed on the basis of a
"market mechanism," linking state planning to market forces. See HUNTER & RYAN, supra note 9, at
23-24; see also OSKAR LANGE, FUNKCJONOWANIE GOSPODARKI SOCJALISTYCZNEJ [The Functioning of
the Socialist Economy] (1960). For a spirited criticism of Lange, however, see JOHN MONTIAS,
CENTRAL PLANNING IN POLAND 267 (1963). While Lange's criticisms were made in the context of
analyzing the flaws of central planning in Poland, their application can be seen as relevant for China as
it has sought to adapt its Stalinist economic model to the market.
11. See Robert C. Berring, Chinese Law, Trade and the New Century, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
425, 436 & 444 (2000) ("Call the current economy 'market socialism' if you wish, but it bears no
relation to communist or socialist theory.").
12. Mark Williams, Wal-Mart in China: Will the Regulatory System Ensnare the American
Leviathan? 39 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1366 n.9 (2007) (citing Javier Silva-Ruete, Alternate Executive
Dir. of IMF for the Constituency of Arg., Bol., Chile, Para., Peru, & Uru., The Development of China's
Export Performance, Address before Conference at the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (Mar. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/030706.htm). Professor Williams describes
the influx of foreign capital into China and notes that "[floreign investment in China is generally
structured via a joint venture vehicle with a local enterprise." Id. at 1371. In the 1990s, Chinese law
required foreign owned retailers to be in the form of a joint venture and, in addition, imposed other
restrictions. Id. at 1367. This regulation was repealed as a result of Chinese accession to the WTO. Id.
at 1371. As a result, China now permits foreign investors to establish wholly-owned foreign
enterprises, which are Chinese legal entities, possessing a separate legal personality. Many may also
have limited liability. See id. at 1372 n.39 (citing Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (Adopted
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. Apr. 12, 1986, revised Jul. 24, 2006), available at
http://openchina.com.es/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/wholly-foreign-owned-enterprise-law-of-the-
people.pdf). The international law firm of Jones Day reports the following information concerning the
basics of foreign investment in China:
Direct foreign investment into the People's Republic of China ("PRC") is
generally carried out through the establishment of a Sino-foreign joint venture
(either an equity joint venture ("EJV") or a cooperative joint venture ("CJV") or
a wholly foreign-owned enterprise ("WFOE") (such vehicles are collectively
referred to as "foreign investment enterprises," or "FIEs"). For more passive,




With the development and growth in international trade and international
investment, China recognized a need to ensure that its domestic market would be
free from price fixing, monopolization, and the effects of invidious agreements
between suppliers and/or competitors that restricted competition. There was also a
strong perception that China needed to curtail foreign economic dominance and to
transform poorly performing state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) into fully-functioning
private enterprises. Attorney Stephen Harris noted: "These policies and many
subsequent structural reforms have been pursued in an avowed effort to transform
China's centrally planned economy, dominated by state-owned-enterprises, to a
system that embodies free market characteristics but retains certain socialist
attributes."' 3 An early attempt at reform was the enactment of the Enterprise Act
of 1988. This law promised that factories would no longer be able to depend on
state subsidies and state support and would face the real prospect of "bankruptcy if
they failed to adapt to market competition." 14 This law, seen as revolutionary in its
time, was described by Zhang Yanning, Deputy Minister of the State Commission
for Restructuring the Economy, as moving away from direct control of central
government departments or authorities over industries toward a system in which
"the state regulates the market, which in turn guides the enterprises," in large part
by making managers responsible for profits and losses.15 However, the effect of
In terms of the legal form, FIEs are almost always established as limited liability
companies, although joint stock companies are also permitted under PRC law.
FIEs closely resemble Western-style corporations in many respects but also
differ in certain fundamental areas, such as the following:
" Investors in an FIE limited liability company do not hold issued
shares per se, but instead hold equity interest in the "registered
capital" of the relevant FIE;
* Voting and decision-making authority in an FIE is generally vested in
the board of directors rather than the investors;
* FIEs generally have a specified term (e.g., 30 years) depending on the
nature of the project, which term can be renewed under PRC law,
although the conditions of any such renewal are not clearly specified
in the law;
* Various matters, including the initial establishment of an FIE, transfer
of a party's equity interest, increase of an FIE's registered capital,
change of an FIE's business scope, and dissolution of an FIE, are
subject to approval by the Chinese authorities; and
" FIEs must operate within an approved "scope of business," which
tends to be relatively specific and, for manufacturing FIEs in
particular, will limit sales activities to the sale of "self-manufactured"
products.
Jack J.T. Huang et al., JONES DAY, Mergers and Acquisitions in China, July 2006,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs detail.aspx?publD=S3571. As Professor Berring notes, "To
attract foreign investment China had to do several things. The first was change its internal culture, the
second was to win the trust of the rest of the world that investing in China was a rational move."
Berring, supra note 11, at 437.
13. Harris, supra note 2, at 173 (citing the Chinese Enterprise Act (1988), the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of 1993, the Company Law (1993), and the Price Law (1997)).
14. Id. (citing Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprises and the BankrTuptcy Law
in the People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1067 (1997)).
15. China Enacts Law Giving More Power to Enterprises, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 1, 1988
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 37:2
this law was problematic. Harris notes that "it [was] broadly agreed that
entrenched government monopolies and local and regional protectionism have
hampered any wholesale transition to market competition."
'1 6
Perhaps reflecting this lack of real progress, China engaged in a wholesale
revamping of its legal system in areas dealing with monopolistic conduct. One of
the first laws enacted was the Law Against Unfair Competition.17 This law was
(quoted in Harris, supra note 2, at 173 n.15).
16. Harris, supra note 2, at 173. One of the reasons for this failure may have been the existence of
the bureaucratic system in managing enterprises. An analogy to the Polish experience seems apt. By
the time of the collapse of the Soviet system in Poland in the period 1989-199 1, the nomenklatura or
bureaucratic system in Poland had developed into a highly centralized administrative structure-not
only for national economic and political organs, but also for intermediary organizations, whereby
smaller enterprises operated only as a part of a huge centrally organized bureaucracy. By the 1980's,
the system had virtually elapsed into a "lunatic collage of incompetence, privilege, pandering and
outright corruption," based on a principle of underqualification and a perverted practice of negative
selection. See, LAWRENCE WESCHLER, SOLIDARITY, POLAND IN THE SEASON OF ITS PASSION102
(1982). It appears that the Chinese system has exhibited many of these same characteristics. For a
description and discussion of the Chinese bureaucratic system, see Eric Zusman & Jennifer L. Turner,
Beyond the Bureaucracy: Changing China's Policymaking Environment, CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 121 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005); David Li, Address at
the Shorenstein Seminars on Contemporary East Asia on The Dynamics of Institutional Change in
China: The Role of the Bureaucracy (Mar. 31, 1998),
http://ieas.berkeley.edu/Shorenstein/1998.03.html; DAVID M. BACHMAN, BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMY,
AND LEADERSHIP IN CHINA (1991). For an interesting "inside" description of the nomenklatura system
as it operated in Central and Eastern Europe, see MILOVAN DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS (1957). Djilas is
credited with coining the term "New Class" as a description of the political and economic bureaucracy.
The term "apparatchik" usually referred to party members, especially in the former Soviet Union. The
term most often used in China to describe the "ruling class" is oligarchy. See also, e.g., Richard J.
Hunter & Leo V. Ryan, Economic Transformation Through Foreign Direct Investment in Poland, 6 J.
EMERGING MKTS. 18 (2001) (providing a comprehensive "country study" of Poland). The role of the
nomenklatura is still hotly debated in Polish society, as it will no doubt be in China. A pattern was
common in transition economies throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe that has been
duplicated during the Chinese "transition." Not surprisingly, members of the nomenklatura in Poland
almost immediately became active in private businesses and banks-especially as the prospects for
advancing their bureaucratic careers in the "new system" appeared more limited. The particular type of
privatization carried out by the nomenklatura in the early period has sometimes derisively been referred
to as "spontaneous privatization," but was, in reality, theft of public assets and property. For a
discussion of the phenomenon of "spontaneous privatization," see HUNTER & RYAN, supra note 9, at
112-13. Directors and managers often used their new authority to split up or divide state companies or
to spin off or divest units into limited liability companies or other new joint ventures-many under their
own control or the control of their friends and associates. Skilled workers were often transferred to the
new enterprises to the detriment of their former enterprises. In many nations of Central and Eastern
Europe-but most especially in Poland-members of the nomenklatura also greatly benefited both
politically and economically from popular discontent that was practically unavoidable during economic
reforms started under very difficult economic and political conditions and circumstances. Members of
the nomenklatura were seen as major "winners" in the transformation process. The issue of winners vs.
losers in post-Communist Poland is discussed at length in Richard J. Hunter, Jr. et al., Out of
Communism to What?: The Polish Economy and Solidarity in Perspective, 39 THE POLISH REV. 328-
329, 334-335 (1994). We offer this information for comparative purposes based on our extensive study
of the processes and results from the transformation throughout the region of Central and Eastern
Europe.
17. Law Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'I People's Cong.,
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enacted in 1993 and would be administered by the State Administration of Industry
and Commerce (SAIC). The major significance of this legislation was that while it
prohibited a broad range of anticompetitive acts, in practice, the law only applied
to the protection of trademarks.'
8
The next significant piece of legislation was the Price Law, which became
effective in 1997, and was administered by the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC).19 Similar to the Law Against Unfair Competition, this
legislation had a broad scope-namely, to outlaw all price fixing. Yet, in a similar
fashion, the Price Law was applied in a more narrow fashion. In particular, the
Price Law merely provided local authorities with the power to control prices and
thus served goals other than ensuring free competition.2 0  In addition, China
enacted other laws, such as the Protection of the Rights of Consumers Act (1993)
and The Company Law (1994)-but these laws too were narrowly construed.2'
General confusion seemed to reign among the various governmental agencies as to
which agency would enforce which laws,22 different remedies were provided for
the same underlying actions, and perhaps most importantly, Chinese officials
lacked the expertise to fully appreciate the complexities of market forces and the
harmful effects that certain other seemingly minor actions might have on the
creation of an otherwise competitive market.
III. CHINA AND THE WTO
China concluded negotiations with the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
September 17, 2001, concerning China's terms of membership. Among the
commitments undertaken by China were the following:
China will provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO
Members. All foreign individuals and enterprises, including those
not invested or registered in China, will be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to enterprises in China with
respect to the right to trade.
China will eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences
in treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in
comparison to those produced for export.
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), translated in CCPIT Patent and Trademark Law Office,
http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/references/Law-Against-Unfair-CompetitionChina.htm (last visited
Dec. 23, 2008) (P.R.C.).
18. Harris, supra note 2, at 175 (citing Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends
and Directions, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 447-49 (1996)). See Law Against Unfair
Competition, art. 5(1).
19. Price Law (issued by President's decree, Dec. 29, 1997, adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., May 1, 1998), translated at China Development Gateway (2004),
http://en.chinagate.com.cn/english/430.htm.
20. Again, the purpose of the law was to establish a new pricing system "compatible with the
requirements of a socialist market system." Harris, supra note 2, at 176 n.33 (citing China's Price Law
Embodies Features of Modern Market Economy, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, (Apr. 30, 1998)(quoting
Wei Dale of the State Development Planning Commission). See Price Law, art. 19.
21. See Monfort, supra note 14, at 1095.
22. See Harris, supra note 2, at 175.
2009
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* [P]rice controls will not be used for purposes of affording
protection to domestic industries or services providers.
* [T]he WTO Agreement will be implemented by China in an
effective and uniform manner by revising its existing domestic
laws and enacting new legislation fully in compliance with the
WTO Agreement.
* Within three years of accession, all enterprises will have the right
to import and export all types of goods and trade them throughout
the customs territory with limited exceptions.
* China will not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on
agricultural products. 23
As China acceded to membership in the WTO on November 11, 2002, many
of China's potential trading partners were quite skeptical that China would be able
to abandon practices that discriminated in its own favor, or would be able to enact
comprehensive legislation aligning the Chinese legal system with global trade
rules and norms.24 After all, it was widely held that "China has traditionally been
suspicious of trade with the West, and has imposed substantial limits and
regulations upon foreigners within the country."2 5 In addition, China voiced a
concern that following "international norms" might result in significant job losses
as a result of the almost inevitable demise of its state-owned-enterprises.
26
However, in balancing these concerns with the prestige and power that
membership in the WTO would certainly bring to China, the overriding hope of
China's accession was that membership in the WTO would act as a "catalyst for
reform as investors seek a more stable, predictable destination for capital. 27
Professor Hoogmartens writes: "The international investor confidence resulting
from WTO membership determines its attractiveness and allows the country to
amass foreign capital to pay for sound domestic reforms and hence, further
industrialization. "
28
In this process, the legal system necessarily would play an important, perhaps
critical, role. The World Bank had noted in 1997: "The transition from a command
economy to a market-oriented economy makes legal rules matter. Direct
23. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on
China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres0l_e/pr243_e.htm.
24. See generally Lindsay Wilson, note, Investors Beware. The WTO Will Not Cure All Ills in
China, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1007, 1007 & 1009-14 (2003) (describing the main issues
confronting the Chinese legal system). By 1980, China had joined both the IMF and the World Bank.
See HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD
BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 75 (1990). China gained observer status in
GATT in 1984-a prelude to full WTO membership.
25. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1007.
26. See generally Jan Hoogmartens, Can China's Socialist Market Survive WTO Accession?
Politics, Market Economy and Rule of Law, 7 LAW & Bus. REV. AMs. 37 (2001).
27. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1029.
28. Hoogmartens, supra note 26, at 43 (citing Monica Hsiao, comment, China and the GATT.- Two
Theories of Political Economy Explaining China's Desire for Membership in the GA TT, 12 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 430, 431 (1994)).
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government control over economic decisions is replaced by the rule of law that is
necessary to protect private property and contract rights." 29  As early as 1999,
China had announced a Five Year People's Court Reform Plan which sought to
"improve China's court system by improving the expertise of judges, enforcing
anticorruption regulations, allowing some discovery, and improving the efficiency
and enforcement of judgments." 30 It may seem ironic, but "The WTO does not
require a member state to have a good legal system, however, or even a fair one.
Instead, it merely insists that foreigners and nationals are treated alike, for better or
for worse., 31 Attorney Lindsay Wilson identified three major "points of interest"
concerning Chinese legal institutions "(1) the lack of a cohesive legal "system;" (2)
pervasive vagueness in the language of statutes and administrative rules; and (3)
difficulty of enforcing judgments once they are obtained.,
32
29. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes: "The rule of law is generally defined as (i)
general, abstract rules that are prospective, never retrospective, in their effect; (ii) rules that are known
and certain; (iii) rules that are equal in that they do not discriminate based on irrelevant distinctions; and
(iv) a separation between regulators and the regulated. The rule of law in the business environment is
expected to guarantee transparency, predictability, and consistency." ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
PRC PRIVATE SECTOR ASSESSMENT, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (2003),
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/PSA/PRC/PRCPSA.pdf. During the 1980s, judges were
routinely appointed from among the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party or from the military. "Only
rarely did these judges have a college education, let alone any sort of legal training." See Wilson, supra
note 24, at 1010. In terms of reforming the "lawyer system" itself in the PRC, it is also important to
note that prior to 1993, lawyers were classified as "state legal workers," and virtually all law firms were
owned or controlled by the State. Beginning in 1993, the Ministry of Justice took several measures to
achieve a fundamental change. These measures included encouraging lawyers to set up private law
firms. See Ma Chenguang, Better Legal Services Sought, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 1; encouraging
more Chinese citizens to take up the legal profession. See also Chang Hong, State Aims to Triple
Number of Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, July 22, 1993, at 3 (scheduling national bar examinations once
each year instead of once every two years); Annual Exam Set for New Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, June 12,
1993, at 3 (granting lawyer status to those who have obtained law degrees in foreign countries, without
first having to pass national bar examinations, provided that the lawyer has worked in a domestic law
firm for one year-designed to accommodate the need for lawyers with certain critical "specialties" or
skills); He Jun, Lawyers to Grow in Number and Role, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 16, 1993, at I. An
interesting parallel to Poland's entry into the EU can be seen in China's accession to the WTO.
30. Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for Foreign Mark
Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 382-83 (2008).
31. Wilson, supra note 24, at 1009.
32. Id. See also Greene, supra note 30, at 383. For a comparative view of various legal aspects of
the transformation process, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr. et al., Legal Aspects of the Transformation
Process in Poland: Business Association Forms, 40 THE POLISH REV. 387, 387-407 (1995). See also
RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR. ET AL., POLAND: A TRANSITIONAL ANALYSIS (2003) (discussing the issues of
foreign direct investment, international trade, taxation, and Poland's accession to the European Union in
the context of economic transition). These issues are equally central in the context of China's
continuing transition or evolution to its unique "socialist market economy." Poland's antimonopoly law
is today a mainstay of its economic transformation. It is termed The Law on Competition and the
Protection of Consumers' Interests of 15 December 2000, and provides:
" Prohibition of concerted practices, agreements and associations between firms which may
prevent, restrict or distort competition and prohibition of abuse of a dominant position;
" Preventive supervision of mergers which may create or strengthen a dominant market position.
POLISH INFORMATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY, COMPETITION LAW (2006),
http://www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=Oe139bI7a92b2df7d6c3c840e5I465fe (summarizing the law and
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As of September 2002, as a part of its accession to the WTO, 2,300 of China's
laws and government regulations that were deemed potentially incompatible with
WTO requirements were carefully reviewed and either amended or repealed.33
China further announced that if there were a conflict between domestic law and
China's obligations to the WTO, the latter would rule-as an indication that the
Chinese Government was committed to the adaptation of the WTO rules-based
regime.34 In addition, and perhaps most importantly, in March of 2001, China's
National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee declared that China would
soon issue a draft of a comprehensive antitrust law that would deal directly with
many of the perceived difficulties in assuring real competition in the Chinese
market.35
IV. DRAFTING THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
As China began to develop its unique socialist market economy, many
commentators noted that it was important to create a transparent legislative regime
that would apply to transactions that directly involved the acquisition of domestic
companies by foreign investors (termed onshore transactions), as well as to
foreign transactions (termed offshore transactions). There were several attempts in
the period 2002-2005 to construct viable and workable antimonopoly legislation.36
The following are the main highlights of the process:
" "In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
('MOFTEC'), a predecessor of MOFCOM [the Ministry of Commerce],
promulgated draft rules on the notice and approval process for
concentrations involving foreign multinationals. These rules were largely
based upon... preexisting restrictions on foreign investment, and were
criticized for the implication that they would be applied solely to foreign
companies [and not to Chinese organizations]. 37
" "In March 2003, the Provisional Mergers & Acquisitions Rules were
promulgated by MOFCOM and SAIC [the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce]. 38
" In June 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
promulgated the so-called "Provisional Rules" in order to deal with the
explaining that it deals with antitrust, merger control, and state aid).
33. See generally, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 29. Among the laws that were
repealed in China was the law that required foreign-owned retailers to be in the form of joint ventures.
See Amendments to Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Submitted to NPC, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Mar. 9, 2001, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/09/eng20010309
64556.html.
34. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 29.
35. Harris, supra note 2, at 176-77.
36. A chronology of the various iterations and stages of the antimonopoly law may be found in
Harris, supra note 2, at 177-181. Harris is a distinguished and recognized expert in the field and was a
participant in a major conference hosted by MOFCOM outside of Beijing in October 2003, attended by
leading academics from China and practitioners from Japan, Germany, and the United States.




expected flood of foreign direct investment prior to the final enactment of
any comprehensive legislation.39  These "provisional rules" were later
called "Regulations on the Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors. ' 4° The limited application of the 2003
rules concerned some foreign investors who interpreted the regulation's
"target" on foreign investors as a possible harbinger of biases that might
continue to prevail in the substance or enforcement of any future
legislation. These "Provisional Rules" included several more traditional
antitrust provisions dealing with price fixing, monopolistic conduct, and
predatory pricing. Harris notes that some saw these provisional rules as a
"serious move toward the enactment of a comprehensive antitrust law.
Others, however, saw the Provisional Rules as an indication that the
drafting of such a law was bogged down, resulting in a few elements of the
draft law being issued in the form of the Provisional Rules. Enforcement
of the Provisional Rules was ultimately abandoned.,
4 1
* In 2003, the State Council Legislative Office (LAO) undertook a thorough
review of the 2002 Draft Antimonopoly Law, prepared by the former State
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).4 2 The October 2002 Draft had
proscribed collusion among businesses, abuse of market dominance, and
excessive concentrations. The 2002 draft had also included provisions
prohibiting abuses of administrative power by governmental units through
what were termed administrative monopolies. Interestingly, Chapter 6 of
the 2002 Draft Law provided for the creation of an Anti-Monopoly
Management Body of the State Council. A later draft diffused
enforcement of the Draft Law among three separate agencies: MOFCOM,
with responsibility for merger review and administrative (state)
monopolies; SAIC, responsible for overseeing "monopoly agreements" and
abuses of a dominant position; and the NDRC, responsibility for price
collusion and bid-rigging.
* The February 2004 draft called for the establishment of a single
"competent Anti-Monopoly Authority under the Ministry of Commerce.'A3
This provision was retained in the July 2004 draft (it was actually
promulgated in March 2004) issued by MOFCOM. Concerns about abuses
39. Id.
40. See Do's, Don'ts of M & As, CHINA DAILY, May 30, 2005, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/30/content_446763.htm. See also FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, NEW CHINESE MERGER CONTROL RULES 1 (2003),
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/5356.pdf (noting that the rules stipulate that
mergers and acquisitions may not "result in excessive concentration and exclusion of competition and
may not disturb the social or economic order or harm public interest"). The four issuing governmental
bodies were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC-now the Ministry
of Commerce), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the State Administration
of Taxation, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
41. Harris, supra note 2, at 178.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 179.
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 37:2
by foreign firms-including Microsoft, Kodak, and TetraPak 44-were
raised in a report issued by the Fair Trade Bureau of SAIC, although
allegations were vigorously denied by these firms. 45 Prior to the release of
the February and March drafts, SAIC indicated in January 2004 that it
supported a limitation of enforcement to private conduct, thereby
exempting official government conduct.46 MOFCOM proceeded to set up
its own Anti-Monopoly Office in September 2004.
" MOFCOM's Anti-Monopoly Office proffered a "Submission Draft" in
February 2004, which was similar to a subsequent March 2005 draft.47
This draft dropped the reference to creation of the MOFCOM enforcement
authority and instead called for the establishment of an "anti-
monopolization authority under the State Council." In April 2005, the
State Council released a draft law, providing for the establishment of an
Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State Council 48 with broad powers to
both implement and enforce the underlying law.49
" A revision dated July 27, 2005, provided a strong basis for the eventual
Anti-Monopoly Law. This draft provided for an Anti-Monopoly Authority
44. See Wang Xiaoye, Report.- Anti-Monopoly Law Vital, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 20, 2004, at 11,
available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/22/content_367692.htm (cited in
Harris, supra note 2, at 179 n.52).
45. See, e.g., Kodak Denies Monopolistic Accusations, CHINA DAILY, June 8, 2004, available at:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/13/content_338954.htm (cited in Harris, supra note
2, at 179 n.53).
46. See Xue Zheng Wang, Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving
Greater Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition, 2, Org. Econ. Coop. Dev.
[OECD] Doc. CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2004)16 (Jan. 9, 2004), available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf (cited in Harris, supra note 2, at 180 n.54)
(asserting that "[a]ntitrust law is supposed to be against private anticompetitive conduct and is not
supposed to be applied to markets that are controlled or regulated by the government"). The SAIC
submission was to an OECD Global Competition Forum.
47. Harris, supra note 2, at 180.
48. Beijing Official Website International, Political System and State Structure,
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Beijinglnfo/BJlnfoTips/BeijingHistory/t951208.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2008) ("The State Council, the Central People's Government, is the highest state administrative body.
The State Council carries out the laws enacted and decisions adopted by the NPC and its Standing
Committee. The State Council is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee, and reports to
them on its work. The State Council exercises the following functions and powers: in accordance with
the Constitution and statutes, formulates administrative measures, enacts administrative regulations,
promulgates decisions and orders; exercises unified leadership over the work of the ministries and
commissions and the work of other organizations under its jurisdiction; exercises unified leadership
over the work of local state administrative bodies at different levels throughout the country; draws up
and implements national economic and social development plans, and the state budget; directs and
administers economic work, urban and rural development, and work in education, science, culture,
public health, physical culture and family planning; directs and administers civil affairs, public security,
judicial administration and supervision, as well as national defense construction; manages foreign
affairs and concludes treaties and agreements with foreign states; and in accordance with the law,
appoints, removes and trains administrative officers, appraises their work, and rewards or penalizes
them. The State Council is composed of the premier, vice-premiers, state councillors, the heads of the
various ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general.").
49. Harris, supra note 2, at 180-81.
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under the State Council, as did the later drafts of September 14, 2005,
September 30, 2005, and of November 2005.50
The Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of 2005 was the culmination of the previous
efforts which began in 2002. Article 1 of the Draft is important because it sets
forth the general parameters and objectives of antimonopoly policy in China: 51
This law is enacted for the purposes of prohibiting monopolistic
conduct, protecting and promoting market competition, safeguarding
the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and public interests, and
ensuring the healthy development of the socialist market economy.
Article 3 of the 2005 Draft defined monopolistic conduct as follows:
"'Monopolistic conduct' is defined in this law as the following activities
which eliminate or restrict competition or are likely to have the effects
to eliminate or restrict competition:
(i) actions among undertakings to come to agreements, decisions, or
other consensus that eliminate or restrict competition (termed
"Monopoly Agreements");
(ii) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;
(iii) concentration of undertakings that are likely to have the effects of
eliminating or restricting competition. 
'
52
This article will not extrapolate on the 2005 Draft and the other "intermediate
steps" noted above. Suffice to note that the drafting of the final legislation in 2006
provoked a great amount of both internal and external debate, including the
solicitation of views and commentary from several international experts and
international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, and nations such as the United States, Japan, Australia and South
Korea, as well as the European Union.53 In early June 2006, the State Council
50. Id. at 182.
51. Id. at 183-84 (asserting that the 2002 Draft had prohibited the existence of "monopoly status,"
seemingly condemning the status of having achieved dominance in the market, even through lawful
competition or conduct). The April 8, 2005 Draft and all subsequent drafts have clearly prohibited
" monopolistic conduct" rather than monopoly itself-placing Chinese law in line with the prevailing
world viewpoint regarding monopolistic conduct. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 82, available at http://www.okm.gov.hu
/doc/upload/200509/hatalyosalapszerzodes_en.pdf (prohibiting abuse of a dominant position, not the
possession or status of a dominant position within the European Union).
52. Harris, supra note 2, at 184.
53. Id. at 175-76. An important International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly Legislation was held in
Beijing in May 2005, hosted by the LAO. The Financial Times recently reported that "China and India
are implementing regimes based on the European Union model, covering anti-competitive agreements,
abuses of dominance, and merger control-with the potential effect on M&A causing concern among
multinational companies." Sundeep Tucker & Patti Waldmeir, Asian Antitrust Laws Threaten Deals,
FIN. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news id
=fto072720081742322031. However, the authors note that "[1]awyers and business executives believe
China and India's thresholds for merger filings are too low, and are likely to ensnare global deals that
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approved in principle the 2005 Draft.54 China's National Party Congress finally
adopted the new Anti-Monopoly Law on August 31, 2007, effective August 1,
2008. 55
V. CHINA'S NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 
(AML) 56
The AML seeks to address issues centering on competition in a
comprehensive manner, not just those relating to monopolization. Thus, the
legislation covers price fixing, conspiracies, mergers, and the abuse of intellectual
property rights, as well as providing a definition of the "market" and penalties for
substantive violations of the law. Article 1, which tracks the 2005 Draft version
very closely, lays out the broad purposes of the AML:
This law is enacted for the purposes of preventing and prohibiting
Monopolistic Conduct, protecting fair market competition, promoting
efficiency of economic operation, safeguarding the interests of
consumers and the public interests, and promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy.
57
Article 4 is also expositive of the general framework for the creation of the
AML:
The State shall formulate and implement competition rules suitable for
the socialist market economy to improve control of the macro-economy
and to strengthen a unified, open, competitive, and orderly market
system.58
There are four major aspects of the AML that will be reviewed in detail:
sections dealing with the scope of review, sections dealing with the creation and
duties of the Anti-Monopoly Commission, sections dealing with prohibited
conduct, and sections dealing with legal liabilities and penalties.
A. Scope of Review
Chapter 1, Article 2 discusses the scope of review. The AML is applicable to
monopolistic conduct 59 in economic activity within the territory of the People's
Republic of China (PRC). The AML is also "applicable to monopolistic conduct
outside the territory of the People's Republic of China that have eliminative or
will have little effect on competition locally. They also fear enforcement agencies in each country will
lack the resources and expertise to deal quickly with complex merger cases." Id.
54. Hu Yuanyuan, China Okays Draft Anti-Monopoly Law, CHINA DAILY, Jun. 8, 2006, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/08/content_611238.htm.
55. China Legislature Passes Anti-Monopoly Law, THE CHINA POST, Aug. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/2007/08/31/120617/China%2Dlegislature.htm.
56. AML, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app.
57. Id. art. 1.
58. Id. art. 4.
59. Id. art. 3. "Monopolistic Conduct," as defined in Article 3, includes:
(1) conclusion of monopoly agreements by undertakings;
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;




restrictive effects on competition in the domestic market of the People's Republic
of China."
60
It is important to note that Article 7 specifically addresses questions relating
to activities of state-owned-enterprises or industries that are controlled by the state
that are deemed "critical to the wellbeing of the national economy and national
security, as well as industries in which exclusive operation and exclusive sales are
the norm of business in accordance with the law.... ,,61
B. Creation of the Anti-Monopoly Commission
Chapter 1, Article 9 calls for the State Council to establish an Anti-Monopoly
Commission which will be responsible for "organizing, coordinating, and guiding"
the administrative activities associated with prohibited conduct.62 Specifically, the
Anti-Monopoly Commission is charged with carrying out the following
responsibilities or duties:
(1) to research and formulate competition policies;
(2) to organize investigations, access the overall market competition
conditions, and publish assessment reports;
(3) to formulate and promulgate anti-monopoly guidelines;
(4) to coordinate the anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work; and
(5) to undertake other duties as designated by the State Council.63
Article 9, however, does not establish whether an existing agency such as
MOFCAM or SAIC will be designated as the Commission or whether a wholly
new Commission will be created. Interestingly, the creation of the Anti-Monopoly
Commission may not completely alleviate concerns over the lack of expertise or
biases of judges who will hear disputes. However, as noted by Subrata
Bhattacharjee of the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section, "since the
enforcement of antitrust law is a relatively new phenomenon [for China], judges
may not have the requisite level of knowledge to produce decisions that conform to
international practice and reflect micro-economic analysis, an observation
admittedly common to many jurisdictions."64  In addition, "in the context of
60. Harris, supra note 2, at 186.
61. AML, art. 7, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app. See, e.g., Robin Gerofsky Kaptzan &
Michael Jacobs, Blake Dawson Waldron, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and Foreign Business
in China, available at:
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business-regulation/antitrust/China'sAntiMonopolyPowerPoi
nt.ppt (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) (listing that the SOEs operating in strategic sectors of the Chinese
economy are "petroleum, natural gas, telecoms, electricity, coal, civil aviation, waterway transport, and
national defense"); see, e.g., Zhengjun Zhang & Zhaoxi Li, Enterprise Research Institute &
Development Research Center of the State Council China, Policy Challenges of Corporate Governance
Reform of SOEs in China (May 15-16, 2006), available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/35/37340418.pdf (discussing current issues concerning Chinese
SOEs).
62. AML, art. 9, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 2.
63. Id.
64. Subrata Bhattacharjee, The Merger Review Process under the New PRC Anti-Monopoly Law:
Selected Issues, 2008 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 9 (presentation at the New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
Teleseminar, Jan. 23, 2008). See also Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in
China: A Third Way for Competition Regime?, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 107, 164 (noting that before
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China's current legal system, it has been suggested that the Chinese judiciary lacks
independence. 65 Mr. Bhattacharjee continues:
The current structure of China's court system and the process for
selecting and promoting judges allows local governments to influence
decisions regarding personnel, as well as financial and material
resources. Accordingly, even if a party exercises its right to judicial
review, some would argue that it is unlikely that a court will come to a
different decision from the one made by the Authority, which may
result in interpretations that are not based on economic principles.
66
C. Prohibited Conduct
Articles 13 through 37 describe the types of conduct that are proscribed by the
AML. The following types of conduct are generally prohibited.
1. Vertical and Horizontal Agreements:
The first type of conduct that is prohibited under the AML is the creation of
horizontal agreements-agreements between competing companies, which are
termed Monopoly Agreements among undertakings with competing
relationships-that restrain trade; or vertical agreements-agreements between a
manufacturer or a distributor within the same marketing chain, which are termed
Monopoly Agreements with their counter-parties.6 7
Article 13 prohibits the following horizontal Monopoly Agreements that
concern:
(1) fixing or changing the price of commodities;
(2) limiting the outputs or sales volume of commodities;
the adoption of the so-called Judge's Law in 1995, "no uniform credentials were required ofjudges, and
formal legal training was also not a prerequisite"); see also Judge's Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), translated in
http//www.accci.com.au/judges-law.htm (2002).
65. Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 9.
66. Id. Attorneys H. Stephen Harris, Jr. and Rodney J. Ganske note:
In countries transitioning to market-based economies, especially where there is
no history of competition enforcement, it is often best not to rely on existing
courts for competition enforcement. A manageable number of specialized
competition judges could be trained within a reasonable time following
enactment and prior to the August 1, 2008 effective date of the Anti-Monopoly
Law, participating perhaps in appropriate portions of the training to be provided
to the staff of the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority. The need for such a
specialized court would seem most important in cases involving allegations of
violations through single-firm conduct, i.e., abuses of dominance under Chapter
III, as such cases require sophisticated understanding of definitions of product
and geographic markets and an understanding of alleged effects on competition,
unlike more straightforward cases involving horizontal collusion such as bid-
rigging or market division.
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Rodney J. Ganske, Alston & Bird LLP, American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law 5 6 h Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting, The Monopolization and IP Abuse Provisions of
China's Antimonopoly Law 19 (Mar. 26-28, 2008), available at: http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/08/03-28-08-Harris-Ganske.pdf.
67. Harris, supra note 2, at 189-90.
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(3) allocating the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets;
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new equipment or
restricting the development of new products;
(5) jointly boycotting transactions; or
(6) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the AML Enforcement
Authority under the State Council.68
Article 14 prohibits the following vertical agreements that:
(1) fix the resale price of commodities sold to third parties;
(2) limit the minimum resale price of commodities sold to third parties; or
(3) other Monopoly Agreements determined by the AML Enforcement
Authority under the State Council.69
However, Article 15 contains significant exceptions to what otherwise might
be considered as "per se" violations of the AML under both Article 13 and Article
15. These include activities conducted:
70
(1) for the purpose of improving technology, researching and developing
new products;
(2) for the purpose of improving the product quality, reducing costs,
enhancing efficiency, unifying specifications and standards of products,
or implementing division of labor based on specialization;
(3) for the purpose of improving operational efficiency of small and
medium-sized undertakings and enhancing their competitiveness;
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests, but not limited to, energy
saving, environmental protection, and disaster relief;
(5) for the purpose of alleviating serious decreases in sales volume or
distinctive production surpluses due to economic depression;
(6) for the purposes of safeguarding legitimate interests in foreign trade and
foreign economic cooperation;
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and by the State Council.71
68. AML, art. 13, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app. See id. art. 10 (creating the Anti-
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council to perform the function of anti-
monopoly enforcement. The AML specifically permits the delegation of this authority to the
" corresponding agencies of the People's Governments at levels of province, autonomous region and
municipality directly under the central government responsibilities....").
69. Id. art. 14.
70. Id. art. 15. See also United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08, 615-19
(1972) (discussing a comparative review of per se violations under United States antitrust law, "[i]t is
only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations of the Sherman Act."). Traditional examples of per se violations include horizontal price
fixing and horizontal division of markets.
71. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (explaining the view of the United
States concerning the application of the reasonableness test and applying a rule or reason test in
recognition that there is a range of economic effects that may result from different types of restraints in
different market structures.). The reasonableness test under the Chinese AML differs from the United
States' reasonableness test in that the United States does not balance the anticompetitive effects of an
agreement against its social or political benefits. It simply inquires whether the agreement promotes or
suppresses competition. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(expressing that "[T]he statutory policy [of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the question of
whether competition is good or bad."). The United States Supreme Court noted: "The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
2009
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Interestingly, if clauses 1-5 are offered as reasons for the non-applicability of
the provisions of Articles 13 and 14, the "relevant undertakings 72 must also prove
that the agreement so concluded will not materially restrict competition in the
Relevant Market 73 and that the agreement can allow consumers to share the
benefits generated therefrom. 74
In addition, also reflecting a "reasonableness" standard, Article 27 contains
the "factors [that] shall be taken into consideration in the review of concentrations
by undertakings":
(1) the market shares of undertakings participating in the concentration in
the Relevant Market and their ability to control... the market;
(2) the degree of concentration in the Relevant Market;
(3) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on market
access and technological progress;
(4) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on consumers
and other relevant undertakings;
(5) the effect that the concentration of undertakings may have on the
development of the national economy;
(6) other factors affecting the market competition that the AML
Enforcement Authority under the State Council deems shall be taken into
consideration.75
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 691 (citing Bd.
of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 246 (1918), quoted in Cont'l TV., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977)). The United States Supreme Court continued in its
discussion of the considerations contained in a rule of reason analysis. "In the second category are
agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose
of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to
decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members
of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by the
Congress." Id. at 692.
72. As used in the AML, "undertakings" refers to natural persons, legal persons, and other
organizations that are engaged in manufacturing or otherwise dealing with commodities, or providing
services. AML, art. 12, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 3.
73. As used in the AML, "Relevant Market" generally means the "scope of commodities and the
scope of territory within which the undertakings compete with each other during a specific period of
time with respect to specific commodities or services (collectively 'commodities')." Id.
74. Id. art. 15(7).
75. Id. art. 27.
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2. Abuse of Power by Dominant Market Holders
A second type of prohibited conduct, stemming from the "abuse of power" by
"dominant market holders," 76 is considered in Chapter 3, Article 17. These
activities include:
(1) selling commodities at unfair high prices or buying commodities at
unfair low prices;
(2) selling commodities at prices below cost without any justification;
77
(3) refusing to transact with counter-parties with respect to a transaction
without any justification;
(4) restricting, without any justification, their counter-parties to transact with
such undertakings exclusively or to transact with other parties designated
by such undertakings exclusively;
(5) engaging in tie-in sales of commodities or imposing other unreasonable
conditions with respect to transactions without any justifications;
(6) applying differential treatments to counter-parties to transactions who
have the same qualifications with respect to transaction price and other
transaction terms, without any justification;
(7) other activities that are deemed by the AML Enforcement Authority of
the State Council as abusing dominant market positions.
78
As with other prohibited conduct, this type of conduct is subject to the
"reasonableness" standard, meaning that the conduct may be proved justified or
legitimate. However, undertakings may be presumed to have a Dominant Market
Position if they satisfy any of the following conditions:
(1) the market share of one undertaking in the Relevant Market accounts for
1/2;
76. The determination that an undertaking has a Dominant Market Position is based on the
following factors as found in Article 18:
(1) The market share of the undertaking in the Relevant Market, and the competition
conditions in the Relevant market;
(2) the ability of the undertaking to control the sales market or the raw material purchasing
market;
(3) the financial resources and the technical capacities of the undertaking;
(4) the extent to which other undertakings depend on the subject undertaking with respect to
relevant transactions;
(5) the level of difficult for the undertakings to enter the Relevant Market;
(6) other factors relating to its determination whether the subject matter has a Dominant
Market Position.
77. The problem of dumping is an especially vexing one for China. Dumping requires a
comparison of "the price of export with the home-market price to see if the former is lower than the
latter so that there is a 'margin of dumping."' JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 335
(2nd ed. 1997). Jackson continues:
Almost by definition, given that such an economy is not based on pricing
principles, the nominal price of goods may bear little relation to prices that
would be set by enterprises in a market/price oriented economy. The prices may
be set by a state planning commission, and may vary according to end user.
Furthermore, the prices may bear little relation to the cost of an enterprise, or
Iprofitability.'
Id.
78. AML, art. 17, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 5.
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(2) the joint market share of two undertakings in the Relevant Market
accounts for 2/3; or
(3) the joint market of three undertakings in the Relevant Market accounts
for 3/4.79
In the case of circumstances set forth in clauses 2 and 3 above, if any of such
undertakings has a market share of less than 1/10, it shall not be presumed to have
a Dominant Market Position. Further, if an undertaking which is presumed to have
a Dominant Market Position presents evidence showing otherwise, it shall not be
deemed to have a Dominant Market Position. Attorneys Harris and Ganske write
that although Article 27 contains the factors noted above for determining "market
dominance," the AML does not fully define how product and geographic markets
will be identified. Further, the inadequacy of this definition has been described as
"unique and troubling" by some scholars."s
3. Certain Concentrations with and without Notification or Approval
There are three concentrations contemplated by Chapter 4, Article 20:
(1) a merger of undertakings;
(2) an acquisition by an undertaking of the control of other undertakings
through acquiring equity or assets;
(3) an undertaking, by contracts or other means, acquiring control of other
undertakings or the capability to exercise decisive influence on other
undertakings.
81
Article 21 stipulates that if a concentration described above meets the
thresholds for notification as stipulated by the State Council, the relevant
undertakings shall file a notification with the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement
Authority under the State Council in advance. Without filing such a notification,
the undertakings will be prohibited from implementing the concentration. In such
a case, the undertakings are required to file a variety of documents and other
materials.
82
79. Id. art. 19.
80. See generally Harris & Ganske, supra note 66 at 2. The authors report that "[u]nder U.S.
antitrust law, market share is the .usual starting point' for assessing the existence of market power." Id.
at 10-11. See also A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, I ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 66 (6th ed. 2007).
Low market shares "virtually preclude a finding of market power, whereas a high market share
indicates the possibility that market power exists." Id. Indeed, proof of a "dominant market share" has
been held to be a requirement for the establishment of market power. See Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4
F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 1993). However, a high market share alone is not proof of market power. An
economic analysis of other "competitive factors" may be able to demonstrate the absence of the
requisite market power despite a high market share, particularly when barriers to market entry are low.
In sum, unlike the application of China's market share percentages, U.S. antitrust law does not establish
presumptions of market power based solely on market share. Id. See, e.g., Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION,
MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITOIN LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS (2005).
81. AML, art. 20, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 6.
82. Included are the following documentation items: the notification, including the name, address,
and business scope of the participating undertakings, the proposed date for implementing the
concentration, and other matters stipulated by the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council;
a statement explaining the impact of the concentration upon the competitive conditions (i.e.,
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Article 27 lays out the factors that should be taken into account in the review
of the proposed concentration by the AML Enforcement Authority under the State
Council. These include:
(1) the market shares of the participating undertakings in the Relevant
Market and their ability to control the market;
(2) the degree of concentration in the Relevant Market;
(3) the effect that the concentration may have on market access and
technological progress;
(4) the effect that the concentration may have on consumers and other
relevant undertakings;
(5) the effect that the concentration may have on the development of the
national economy;
(6) other factors affect competition that the AML Enforcement Authority
under the State Council deems shall be taken into consideration.
83
In reviewing these considerations, the AML Enforcement Authority under the
State Council shall prohibit a proposed concentration "if such [a] concentration has
or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition."t 4 However, the
authorities may instead decide not to prohibit a concentration "if the undertaking
can prove that the positive effects of such concentration on the competition
obviously overweigh its negative effects or that the concentration is in the public
interest." 85 In the alternate, if the AML Enforcement Authority under the State
Council does not prohibit the concentration, it may instead decide to impose
restrictive conditions in order "to reduce the adverse effects that the concentration
may have on competition." 86 In either case, the AML Enforcement Authority
under the State Council shall publicize, in a timely manner, its decision to prohibit
the concentration or to impose any restrictive conditions.87
A second category of prohibited conduct under Chapter 4 is the merging or
acquiring of companies under certain circumstances without notification or
approval, found in Article 22. Undertakings are not required to file any
notification with the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council if their
concentration meets any of the following conditions:
(1) one undertaking participating in the concentration owns more than 50%
of the voting shares or assets of each of the other participating
undertakings;
competition) of the Relevant Market; the concentration agreement; audited financial and accounting
reports of the undertakings participating in the proposed concentration in the preceding fiscal year; and
other documents and materials under the AML Enforcement Authority under the State Council. Id. art.
23.
83. Id. art. 27.
84. Id. art. 28.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 29.
87. Id. art. 30. Articles 24-26 deal with issues concerning the required filing of supplementary
documents (Art. 24), a preliminary review and notification requirements (Art. 25), the completion of the
review (Art. 26), and the circumstances that involve an extension of time (Art. 26, para. 2 (1)-(3)).
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(2) more than 50% of the voting shares or assets of every undertaking
participating in the concentration are owned by a single undertaking that
does not participate in the concentration.
88
Four specific problems may be identified concerning Article 22. First,
acquiring control of a company is considered a concentration, but the term control
is never fully defined. 89 Bhattacharjee cited Harris and Yang, and notes somewhat
wryly that "experience in other jurisdictions reveals that creative lawyers and
businesspersons can structure transactions in a manner to avoid being caught by
the merger rules." 90 Second, no specific timeline has been established concerning
the time period during which a company must notify Chinese authorities; instead,
Article 21 uses the term "in advance." Third, as with other provisions, Article 28
permits parties to attempt to persuade the AML Enforcement Authority that the
positive effects of a concentration outweigh (overweigh) any negative effects; but
the AML provides no real guidelines on this point, unless the provisions
established under Article 15 are applicable under this article as well. Fourth,
thresholds for concentrations requiring notifications are not set, perhaps reflecting
the earlier criticisms of notification requirements generated in earlier drafts and in
the current mergers and acquisitions rules.91  Article 22 describes only two
situations, noted as "exemptions," from the notification requirements, and these
exemptions do not reference traditional exemption thresholds, such as
concentrations not exceeding certain defined market shares or market values. On
this specific topic, Bhattacharjee noted:
The AML is silent on the nature of merger notification thresholds.
Ordinarily, this would not be a concern, given the tendency in many
jurisdictions to leave such details (which may change over time) to
regulation. However, the AML is silent with respect to the basis for
notification. Earlier drafts of the AML included notification thresholds
based on assets, turnover and market share, but the current AML does
not define the notification threshold in any way.
92
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Article 31 requires approval that is
separate from the normal merger approval for concentrations between a foreign
investor and a domestic company which "concerns national security." This
provision is highly controversial and problematic, both because it fails to define
88. Id. art. 22.
89. See Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 8 (noting that examples night include defining "control"
as control at the board of directors level through the holding of voting interest or the possession of
contractual power to designate a portion of the board-as is the case in the United States and Canada).
The author also raises the possibility that control might include exercising "decisive influence" over an
undertaking-as is the case in the European Union. The issue of control raises the question of the
continued existence of the "Golden Share" in China, which perpetuates majority Chinese control of
foreign investment. The existence of the "Golden Share" is problematic in light of China's membership
in the WTO.
90. H. Stephen Harris & Kathy Lijun Yang, China: Latest Developments in Anti-Monopoly Law
Legislation, 19 ANTITRUST 89, 92 (2005) (cited in Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 7 n.28).
91. See Harris, supra note 2, at 211 (describing the criticism of the prior legislative thresholds).
92. Bhattacharjee, supra note 64, at 8.
VOL. 37:2
2009 CHINA'S COMPETITION LAWS
"national security," and because it is not standard policy for a sovereign to frame
its antitrust laws to this extent and in this manner.93 Many commentators have
voiced concern that the vagueness of this provision will allow China to reject or
approve a transaction for political rather than legal or economic reasons,94
reflecting the increasing concern that China has voiced about alleged foreign
domination in important sectors of its domestic market. In defense of the Chinese
position, however, it should be noted that in 2002, Kodak dominated almost 50%
of the photographic film market in China; Nestle held about 40% of the instant
coffee market; Procter and Gamble had a 30% share of the hair care market;
Hewlett-Packard held 25% of the commercial internet-service market; and Epson
held a 30% share of the computer-printer market.
95
4. Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights
The fourth type of prohibited conduct is the abuse of intellectual property
rights (IPRs).96 Specifically, Article 55 of the AML states:
This law shall not apply to Undertakings' conducts that are exercising
their intellectual property rights in accordance with the provisions of
laws and administrative regulations relating to intellectual property
rights. However, this law shall apply to Undertakings' conducts that
93. For a full discussion of the issues surrounding an assertion of "national security," see id. at 9-
10. See also id. at 10 n.41 (providing "negative media attention" and citing Jamil Anderlini, Investors
Fear China Monopolies Law, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007); China Approves Anti-Monopoly Law that
Bans Discrimination Fears, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, (Sept. 5, 2007).
94. See Zhuoyao Hui, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Pretext for Local Protection or an
Aspiration to Comply with the International Norm? ILL. BUS. L.J. (2007), available at
http://iblsjoumal.typepad.com/illinoisbusiness law-soc/2007/l I /chinese-anti-mo.html (noting that
Chinese AML is based upon the European Community (EC) anti-competition law, Japanese AML, and
U.S. Antitrust Law, and stating that none of these countries' competition laws include some "abstract
aspirational goals that might give the Chinese government grounds for invalidating a foreign
enterprise's business conduct").
95. See MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN
198 (2005).
96. For a general discussion of key IPR issues in international business, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr.,
A Primer on Key International Intellectual Property (IPR) Issues, 5 EUR. J. ECON., FIN. & ADMIN. SCI.
103 (2006). The International Chamber of Commerce has identified general issues and "tensions"
between intellectual property rights and antitrust and three "distinct ways in which anti-competitive
practices may prove to be anticompetitive:
(i) A dominant position resulting from ownership of IP property may be
abused by its owner.
(ii) A licensor may impose restrictive licensing terms on his licensee which
secure inappropriate reward for his intellectual property.
(iii) If a patent Office grants patents of low quality, and if the law is generally
uncertain, competitors of patentees may choose to respect them rather than
to ignore or challenge them. "
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CURRENT AND EMERGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ISSUES FOR BUSINESS 65 (9th ed. 2008), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/intellectualproperty/pages/IP_Roadmap-
2005(l).pdf.
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eliminate or restrict competition by abusing their intellectual property
rights.97
Revamping of Chinese law in the area of IPR protection was seen as critical
to the prospects for the long-range development of the Chinese economy, as
"Rampant piracy of intellectual property in China has undermined foreign
confidence in the Chinese market's ability to absorb foreign technology and
copyrighted material without cannibalizing it." 98 Lee and Mansfield reported that
China's weak IP protection has "a significant negative impact on the location of
U.S. FDI."99 As a result of the world-wide importance placed on IP protection,
this provision perhaps may be the most controversial of all because of its
vagueness and because China has historically offered limited, if any, protection to
intellectual property holders. Jianyang Yu, a partner in a Chinese law firm,
reported on the early period of China's transition from a socialist to a market
economy. Yu noted that despite major changes in the IPR regime in China,
"problems continue[ed] to exist in the protection of intellectual property. There
are defects in intellectual property laws and in the coordination among the courts
and government agencies, and there is much to be done to enforce the intellectual
property laws effectively."' 00 "According to Maria Lin, an attorney with Morgan
97. AML, art. 55, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 14.
98. Jonathan C. Spierer, Intellectual Property in China: Prospectus for New Market Entrants,
HARV. ASIA Q., 46 (Summer 1999) (cited in Yahong Li, Pushing for Greater Protection: The Trend
Toward Greater Protection of Intellectual Property in the Chinese Software Industry and the
Implications for the Rule of Law in China, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 637, 640 n.14 (2002)).
99. Reported in Yahong Li, supra note 98, at 641 n.16. It is also quite ironic, but as Alford points
out, "[t]he most significant rationale for intellectual property law lies with the welfare of the Chinese
people themselves. They are now, and seem likely in the foreseeable future to continue to be, the
greatest victims of the infringement of intellectual property that is rampant throughout the vast nation.'"
William P. Alford, Making The World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights,
Property Law and American Foreign Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 135, 136 (1997). See also Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory
Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 283
(2008).
100. For a description of the early efforts (1992-1994) at reforming the Chinese IPR regime, see
Jianyang Yu, People's Republic of China: Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.. Progress,
Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140 (1994). Yu counted among the various
changes an amended Patent Law and Trademark Law; China's joining four international conventions on
intellectual property; strengthening or making available criminal sanctions on infringement of
intellectual property; and China's courts and administrative authorities aggressively attempting to
enforce its IPR law in practice. Id. at 161. Among the international conventions mentioned by Yu
include the Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, effective on October
15, 1992; the Universal Copyright Convention, effective on October 30, 1992; the Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms,
effective on April 30, 1993; and on September 25, 1992, China issued the International Copyright
Treaties Implementation Rules ("Rules"), which became effective on September 30, 1992. These rules
were formulated in order to implement the various international conventions which China had joined-
most especially the Berne Convention. Key provisions of the 1992 "Rules" include:
" protecting unpublished foreign works under the copyright laws;
" protecting foreign works of applied art for a term of twenty-five years;
" protecting foreign computer programs as literary works without requiring their registration;
" protecting foreign works that are created by compiling non-protectable materials, but which
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& Finnegan, 'While China has many laws to protect intellectual property ....
enforcement of such laws has been problematic as the court system is still in the
process of reform, and relevant administrative bureaus have problems delegating
authority.' 10 1
Concern over the lack of protection of IPRs was voiced by the International
Bar Association in 1995, which noted:
[T]he borderline between fair exercise of IP rights and the abuse of IP
rights is not well defined under any jurisdiction. An attempt to draw a
dividing line through legislation is commendable but should leave no
illusions as to the urgent need for future clarification through case-law
or administrative practice.... Therefore, timely guidance on the concept
of restrictions of competition "beyond the laws and administrative
regulations on intellectual property rights," under this provision would
be appreciated, especially as intellectual property laws are typically
silent on competition-related questions. 102
Attorneys Harris and Ganske report that the vagueness of the AML
concerning issues relating to the abuse of IPRs has caused many to question
possess originality;
" eliminating certain limitations imposed by the Copyright Law on the copyright owner's rights
to comply with the Berne Convention; and
" protecting foreign works which, at the moment when the various international conventions
came into force in China, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin
after the expiration of the term of protection.
Id. at 143. Yu also identifies a problem with the legal system itself. China officially operates on the
basis of the "civil law" system in which judicial decisions do not enjoy stare decisis status, "[h]ence
there are notable disparities among court decisions and no clear judicial tests to determine whether
infringements have occurred." Id. at 158. Yet, as Professor Berring notes, "[t]he existing Chinese
legislative opus is a patchwork drawn from both the civil and common law traditions. Each year it
grows more complete and its implementation improves. Huge problems remain in predictability and
enforcement but the commercial structure grows more stable." Berring, supra note 11, at 439 (citing
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAD 383-432 (1999)). The
situation may have been exacerbated by China "reclaiming" Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Hong Kong
had generally adopted the Common Law system, based on precedent and the rule of stare decisis. Hong
Kong has held an advantage in that its common law tradition has allowed it to maintain its status as a
part of a global legal system, with membership in a number of international treaties and organizations.
Thus, at least as it relates to commercial transactions involving Hong Kong and China, there exists the
paradigm of "one nation, two systems." See Berry Fong-Chung Hsu, Legislative Control of Hong Kong
Financial Markets: Some Aspects of Banking and Securities Regulations, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
649, 651-52 (1997). Interestingly, as Shanghai has made known its intentions to be the commercial
leader in China, its legal system has come under some scrutiny. In contrast to Hong Kong, Shanghai
has a reputation for rendering verdicts "in the national interest"-at least in its maritime courts. See
Richard McGregor, Shanghai Sees Law as Key to Being Commercial Hub, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2002.
See also Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
97, 99-100 (2005).
101. Yahong Li, supra note 98, at 650.
102. See Working Group on the Development of Competition Law in the People's Republic of
China, International Bar Association, Comments on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) 69-70 (2005), available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%/
20Submission.pdf.
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whether this provision, as it will be enforced, will result in the loss or diminution
of adequate intellectual property protection in China. They urge that the law be
significantly clarified and note:
Absent such clarification, holders of valuable IP may fear the
imposition of compulsory licensing (or compulsory disclosure of
technical data) as a sanction for a finding of an abuse based on a mere
refusal to license IP, or the imposition of conditions in IP licenses that
are later determined to be unfair.
10 3
The United States has been especially pointed in its criticism of China's IPR
policies. The Office of the United States Trade Representative annually issues a
"Special 301 Report" on the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection by U.S. trading partners.' 0 4  This Report provides an
important worldwide benchmark for the evaluation of China's IPR regime. Article
55 of the AML is an attempt to deal with the problematic nature of China's IPR
protection.'°0
Concerns have been raised concerning the vagueness of Article 55. Some
observers have been optimistic that this provision will, in fact, be further clarified
and that Article 55 will provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights.
They point to the creation of a Judicial Court of Intellectual Property as an
103. Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 7.
104. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19
(2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Reports Publications/2008/2008_Special
301 ReportlSectionIndex.html. Concerning China, the Report notes:
China remains a top intellectual property enforcement and TRIPS compliance
priority for the United States. China will remain on the Priority Watch List, and
remain subject to Section 306 monitoring. The United States is seeking to
resolve its concerns with respect to three IPR protection and enforcement issues
through WTO dispute settlement with China .... The United States recognizes
and appreciates the efforts of the many officials in China who continue to give
voice to China's commitment to protecting intellectual property rights and are
working hard to make it a reality. In spite of these efforts, the shared goal of
significantly reducing IPR infringement throughout China has not yet been
achieved.
Id. The Special 301 Report placed forty-six countries on the Priority Watch List, the Watch List, and
the Section 306 Monitoring List. There are nine countries that have been placed on the 2008 Priority
Watch List: China, Russia, Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, and Venezuela.
According to the United States government, through the office of the United States Trade
Representative, countries on the Priority Watch List "are the focus of increased bilateral attention
concerning the problem areas." Id. at 18. Thirty-six trading partners are on the lower level Watch List,
meriting bilateral attention to address IPR problems: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala,
Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Paraguay will continue to be subject to Section 306 monitoring
under a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding that establishes objectives and actions for addressing
IPR concerns in that country. Id.
105. AML, art. 55, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 14.
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indication of the seriousness of China's intentions. 106  Harris stresses theimportance of effecting further concrete steps in the area of IP protection:
One step toward reaping these rewards would be clarifying the
provision regarding possible violations of the new law by virtue of
undefined "abuses" of intellectual property rights. Otherwise, a
contraction in investment in China's high technology markets and a
forestalling in the licensing of leading technologies to Chinese
enterprises can be expected.
10 7
However, on the other hand, other commentators are less optimistic, noting
recent comments by We Zhenguo, Deputy Director General of MOFCOM's
Department of Treaty and Law/Anti-Monopoly Office, who described common
abuses from IP holders that limit "competition and seek monopolies by means of a
package of compulsory licensing, placement of supplementary irrational conditions
in licensing contracts and collection of irrational license fees by making use of
their dominant market positions." 10 8
Finally, a substantive criticism of Article 55 lies in the fact that the AML is
silent on the question of punishment of an Article 55 violation. Columnist Adam
Cohen notes that the Article must clarify whether a consequence of a violation of
Article 55 should include nullification of the rights or compulsory licensing. 10 9
D. Legal Liabilities and Penalties
A discussion of Legal Liabilities and Penalties may be found in Chapter
Seven, Articles 46-50. These articles are "subject matter/category" based. In
general, Article 46 provides for several generic penalties by the AML Enforcement
Authority in the case where undertakings conclude and implement illegal
Monopoly Agreements. These penalties and actions include:
* an order to the undertakings to stop such illegal acts (similar to a "cease
and desist" order under U.S. antitrust law);
106. China to Open Anti-piracy Court, BBC NEWS, March 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4793530.stm. The article reported that in 2005, 700 people had
been convicted in 505 criminal piracy cases; China also shut down 76 websites and demanded that 137
others remove illegal materials. Ironically, the BBC reported that "The vast majority of product piracy
cases-95%-involve imitation of Chinese products by Chinese companies." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Harris, supra note 2, at 171.
108. Reported in Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 8.
109. Adam Cohen, China's Draft Antitrust Law Sows Worries in the West, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2006, at A12 (describing the concerns of the world's largest holders of patents and the possibility of
forced royalty-free licensing). The WTO defines compulsory licensing as "[W]hen a government
allows someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent
owner. It is one of the flexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO's agreement on
intellectual property - the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement."
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND TRIPS (2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/TRIPse/public healthfaq_e.htr. See also Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15,
1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Multilateral Trade
Negotiations-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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* confiscation of "illegal gains"; 110 and
* the imposition of fines of more than 1% and less than 10% of their sales in
the preceding year.11
Article 46 provides that if the monopoly agreement has not been implemented,
fines of less than RMB 500,000 may be imposed. 12 Further, if the undertakings
on their own initiative report information and provide important information, the
AML Enforcement Authority may reduce the penalty imposed or grant an
exemption from the penalty.
Article 47 provides for the same penalties as noted above where undertakings
illegally abuse their Dominant Market Positions.11 3  Article 48 provides for
penalties in the cases of illegal concentrations, relating to illegal merger or
acquisition activities. In such cases, the AML Enforcement Authority shall:
* order the undertakings to stop implementing the concentration;
14
* dispose of equity or an asset within a specified time limit; 
15
* transfer their business within a specified time limit;' 1 6 and
* take other necessary measures to revert to the condition of the undertakings
before the concentration.'
1 17
In addition, the AML Enforcement Authority may impose a fine of no more
than RMB 500,000. In considering the appropriateness of any potential fines to be
levied under Articles 46, 47, and 48, Article 49 stipulates that the AML
Enforcement Authority shall take into account the "nature, extent and duration of
the illegal act and other factors in determining the specific amount" of any fine
imposed."1 t
Article 50 is both interesting and potentially controversial. It provides that
"Undertakings that cause loss to others as a result of their Monopolistic Conduct
110. In infringement cases, damages are usually calculated on one of the following bases: "(1) the
intellectual property owner's actual economic loss caused by the infringement; (2) the infringer's total
profits derived from the infringement; or (3) an amount no less than a reasonable royalty." Jianyang
Yu, supra note 100, at 159.
111. AML, art. 46, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 12.
112. As of the writing of this paper, 1 CNY (China Yuan Renminbi- RMB) = 0.1458 USD (July 7,
2008). Exchange Rates Data, Chinese Yuan, American Dollar, x-rates.com, http://www.x-
rates.com/d/USD/CNY/data120.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). RMB 500,000 would amount to a
maximum fine of approximately $72,900. The RMB is a "fixed currency." The current amount of any
fine would not be expected to fluctuate greatly.
113. AML, art. 47, translated in Bush, supra note 2, at app, 12.
114. Id. art. 46.
115. Id. art. 48.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 49.
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shall be liable for civil liabilities in accordance with laws." 119  At least one
commentator has argued that this provision applies to consumers 12 but may not be
applicable to competitors within or outside the Chinese market.
VI. TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
China's new AML represents a significant step in China's transition from its
command-and-control economy toward the creation of a socialist market
economy-however that may ultimately be defined. The enactment of the
comprehensive AML also represents a significant step towards assuring the global
acceptance of China as a full international partner in international trade and in the
continued attraction of significant amounts of foreign direct investment.
1 2 1
However, the AML which became effective on August 1, 2008, is but the first step
in what may prove to be a long process of reconstruction and revision of China's
antimonopoly regime. In their evaluation, Harris and Ganske lay out several major
concerns that will need to be addressed if China is to remain on its glide path to
success and continued economic progress.1 22  We strenuously urge policy
makers-both in China and in the capitals of their trading partners-to pay special
and close attention to the recommendations of these noted policy experts. Based
upon our detailed analysis of the most important provisions of the AML, we will
amplify upon these conclusions and add our own concerns. These include:
1. Provisions of the AML related to dominant market position (Articles 6
and 17) are vague and will require significant refinement and the
adoption of clarifying guidelines in a relatively short time after the
effective date, through the adoption of Implementation Rules or other
clarifying guidelines.
119. Id. art. 50.
120. Michael X.Y. Zhang, Private Civil Lawsuits under China Anti-Monopoly Law, Antitrust Law
Blog, http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2008/04/articles/article/private-civil-lawsuits-under-china-
antimonopoly-law (April 7, 2008) (hosted by Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton L.L.P.). It appears
that the writers of the AML changed the wording of Article 50 to "others" from the terms previously
used in earlier version-"party with interest." Id. Zhang concludes that "The AML should be very
cautious in granting the right to sue to competitors, and perhaps withhold entirely until the potential
procedural abuses are resolved, and the scope of the AML itself is more established." Id.
121. The CIA reports that aggregate FDI into China had reached 758,900,000, 000 in 2007. In
addition, Chinese exports reached 1,217,000,000,000 and imports into China were 901,300,000,000 in
2007. CIA, supra note 1. The Asian Development Bank reported that government policy in China has
"'changed substantially" and has evolved through several stages. In the initial stage (1978-1985),
foreign investors were restricted to export-oriented operations. This stage saw "export processing
zones" established for Hong Kong, Guangdong, and the four original "special economic zones" that had
been created in Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai. Hainan was later added, offering foreign
investors preferential treatment in the form of tax incentives. The second phase (1986-1991) provided a
list of industrial sectors to which FDI was "encouraged, restricted, and prohibited." Foreign investors
were also allowed to sell and manufacture goods in China. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra
note 29, at 16.
122. Harris & Ganske, supra note 66, at 1-2.
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2. Because of the enormity of the issues involved and their importance in
attracting FDI, the AML's relationship to intellectual property rights
needs more clarity, especially in light of the strong worldwide
perception of the lack of enforcement of IPRs in China in the past.
Issues relating to piracy, industrial espionage, and "grey market
goods " must be specifically addressed.
3. The Chinese approach to what has been termed "collective dominance,"
which presumes the dominant position of multiple entities based on
their combined market share, "is unique and troubling.,
123
4. There have been grave concerns raised about the administration of the
AML in two quarters. First, the AML Enforcement Authority has been
placed within the competency of the Chinese State Council-essentially
a political body with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party. In
addition, there is concern that under Article 10, administration of the
AML may be devolved to lower level or local government bodies with
potentially skewed or biased views1 24 against foreign competition.
5. The lack of experience within the legal system in the administration of
antitrust 125 or anti-competition law and a lack of expertise on the proper
functioning of a capitalist market economy in courts of "general
jurisdiction" throughout China may indicate that Chinese courts may be
unable to properly interpret the AML.
6. Provisions relating to "national security" need to be fleshed-out and
limited to circumstances generally accepted as such under international
norms and international law with due respect given to Chinese
sovereignty.
7. Provisions relating to the "well being of the national economy" found
in Article 31 need to be developed and defined. A clear reference point
must be established.
8. The term "public interest" found in Article 1 and Article 15 must be
defined and explained.
9. The phrase, "legitimate interest in foreign trade and foreign economic
cooperation," must be refined and extrapolated.
123. Id. at 1.
124. There continues to be a problem with enforcing judgments in the Chinese legal system.
Attorney Lindsay Wilson reports "Judgments also remain unenforced because of local protectionism
and 'selfish departmentalism.' Government departments often simply refuse to cooperate, and parts of
the government, such as the military, are immune from any legal action unless they choose to submit.
In the private sector, insolvent corporations can escape payment, and it is difficult to dock the wages of
employees. Courts, which depend on political capital even in the most balanced systems, are reluctant
to coerce compliance with their dictates." Wilson, supra note 24, at 1022 nn.105-108 (citing LUBMAN,
supra note 100, 266-68).
125. See Tucker & Waldmeir, supra note 53. The authors note that ironically, in fact China's
threshold for merger filings may be too low-fearing that enforcement agencies may lack both the
resources and expertise to deal with more complex merger cases.
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10. Chinese authorities must explain exactly what is meant when they
assert that they will balance any anticompetitive effects of an
agreement against "social or political benefits." What exactly are these
"social or political benefits"?
11. Concerning abuses in the market, Chinese authorities must define
"unreasonable conditions" concerning the existence of permissible "tie-
ins" in the domestic Chinese economy, especially as China continues to
develop its activities in international franchising and leasing.
126
12. The persistent use of the term "other factors related to its
determination" needs to be accompanied by clear legislative or
administrative guidance so as to avoid the impression that the
established rules are subject to the vagaries of interpretation of the
Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority.
13. China must continue to reform its legal system, especially emphasizing
the need for the existence of a judiciary free from Communist Party
influence.
However, even given these perceived deficiencies-which may more
positively be considered as opportunities for significant improvements-China's
experience with developing its unique "socialist market economy" has generally
proven to be positive.
Today, China is very different from the one established in revolution in 1949
when "Chairman Mao mounted Tiananmen and declared the founding of the
People's Republic of China"; 27 or when China began its "March to the Market" in
1978; or when China began creating an efficient and functioning antimonopoly
regime in 2002. In fact,
[Three hundred] million people have escaped poverty in less than a
generation, and millions are migrating from the countryside to places
like Chongqing, where the juggernaut of capitalism is powering a rapid
transformation.... In the past one saw the occasional car; now the nation
is putting 25,000 new vehicles on the road every day.... People talked
openly about wanting to get rich, a desire once verboten.1
28
The 2008 AML is yet another step in this progression.
126. See generally Hector R. Lozada et al., Master Franchising as an Entry Strategy: Marketing
and Legal Implications, 4 COASTAL Bus. J. 16, 24-25 (2005), available at:
http://www.coastal.edu/business/cbj/pdfs/articles/spring2005/lozada-hunter-kritz.pdf
127. Berring, supra note 11, at 443.
128. Felicia R. Lee, Ted Koppel Tours a China Brimming with Dreams and Consumerism, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2008, at E3 (discussing Ted Koppel's recent visit to China and the documentary "Koppel
on Discovery: The People's Republic of Capitalism").
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